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MARKETING AND THE LAW

One of the legal challenges of marketing is the interpretation and
understanding of existing laws. In Chapter 19, Akpamgbo takes time
to describe the main provisions of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Decree, popularly known as the 'Indigenisation Decree'. Because of
the importance of this Decree it has also been described by many as
the 'business charter in Nigeria'. It specifies business activities that
may be undertaken by Nigerians and by non-Nigerians. The main
aspects of this Decree are provided as Schedules I, II and III attached
to Chapter 19 of this book. In his commentary, Akpamgbo explains
how this Decree should be interpreted and applied, and indicates how
it affects the task of the marketing executive and the marketing
process in Nigeria.

17. The Impact of Law on Marketing

I. Introduction

Marketing is the practical disposal of goods and services to consumers. It is normally in a state of flux. It is subject to remarkable
shifts as a result of changes in environment and time. Marketing cannot be practised in a vacuum. It functions within human societies and
it is imperative that it be carried out within the confines of the law. At
the same time, such laws must, . of necessity, conform with the
experience and the circumstances of the given society.
It must, however, be borne in mind that law, like the social sciences,
is dynamic in nature, although the rate of change is painfully slow.
Laws guiding the practice of marketing have developed much faster in
some countries than in others. In fact, in most developing countries, of
which Nigeria is one, laws regulating business activities in general and ·
marketing in particular are yet to be developed to meet the challenges
of a rapidly developing market economy.
It is obvious that marketing is experiencing momentous changes.
Laws relating to marketing are catching up fast with.the change. This
being the case, manufacturers or producers who were once relatively
well insulated from loss from actions by injured consumers who had
purchased from resellers, are now vulnerable to suit from a vast
number of claimants in most jurisdictions.! The changing social and
legal environment is gradually forcing manufacturers to take greater
responsibility for the goods they produce and sell.
This paper attempts to investigate the impact on marketing of recent
changes in legislation.
Experience shows that in the Nigerian situation the bulk of
businessmen 2 hardly ever stop to relate law to their activities. The
need to consider the legal consequences of their engagements is either
not fully appreciated or not considered necessary at all. Consequently,
the law is only resorted to when a mistake in business transactions has
already resulted in substantial damage. For example, a good number
of traders in the markets of Onitsha, Enugu, Ibadan, Zaria and Aba
etc., never consider the fact that the seller has legal obligations towards
buyers. Conversely, many retailers hardly remember that they have
165
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corresponding rights and obligations vis-a.-vis their suppliers and
customers.
II. Contract as it affects marketing

In the main, the law which regulates the relationship of the growing
number of businessmen in the general conduct of their business activities is largely the law of contract. Marketing, being an essential arm
of business, is deeply rooted in the law of contract. Consequently, the
marketer must of necessity be well versed in the essential elements;
. A contract is made where parties have reached agreement, or where
they are deemed to have reached agreement, and the law recognises
rights and obligations arising from the agreement. For a contract to be
validly made, the following elements are indispensable:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

offer and acceptance;
capacity of the parties;
intention to create legal relations;
consideration.

Let us look at these briefly. Offer is an undertaking by the offeror to
be contractually bound in the event of a proper acceptance being
made. The law requires that for any offer to be effective it must be
clear, complete and final. 3 When such an offer is made, it must be
communicated to the offeree by the offeror. It is important to note that
an .offer may be communicated in any manner whatsoever. Express
words may be used, oraIly or in writing or an offer may be implied
from conduct. An offer may be partly implied and partly expressed.
But an offer has no validity unless and until it is communicated to the
offeree so as to give him the opportunity to accept or reject.
Sometimes it is possible for an offer to be communicated generaIly to
. ~the whole world. 4 Where an offer is made to a particular person or
group of persons, no valid acceptance may be made by a person who
is not an offeree. Acceptance of an offer must be unqualified and must
correspond exactly with the terms of the offer. A counter-offer
operates as a rejection. When an offeree makes a counter-offer, the
original offer is deemed to have been rejected and cannot be subsequently accepted. s Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that
neither an invitation to treat nor a mere statement of price is an offer.
The law requires that parties to a contract which will be enforceable
in court of law must have full capacity. In law, persons may be natural
or artificial. The general rule is that all natural persons (i.e. people)
have full contractual capacity, but there are exceptions in the case of
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infants, drunken persons, insane persons and enemy aliens. Artificial
persons are corporations whose contractual capacity depends on the
manner in which they were created. In order to benefit from a contrac. tual right, or to incur a contractual obligation, a contracting party
must have appropriate capacity. Right and obligations can exist only
where there is capacity to support them. Incapacity may, therefore,
affect the apparent rights and obligations created by a contract.
The intention to create legal relations is another essential element
in contract. Where no intention to be bound can be attributed to the
parties there is no contract. The test of intention is objective. The
courts seek to give effect to the presumed intentions of the parties. In
commercial and business agreements, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parties intend to create legal relations. The parties are not
contractually bound where the agreement is expressed as binding in
honour only, or where it is expressed as subject to contract. In an
agreement of a social or domestic nature, there is a presumption that
the parties did not intend legal relations to arise. But this presumption
is also rebuttable by evidence to the contrary.
Consideration is a vital element of a valid contract. A valuable Consideration 'may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit
accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or
responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.'6 In an action
on a simple contract, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's
promise was part of a bargain between the parties. The plaintiff must
show that he gave, or promised to give some advantage to the defendant in return for his promise. This advantage moving from the plaintiff to the defendant is known as valuable consideration.
It is a complete defence for the defendant to show that no consideration was given. A bare promise is not binding, e.g. if Agbo
promises to make a gift of ~ 10 to Bela and subsequently changes his
mind, Bela cannot succeed against Agbo for breach of contract.
Even though we have discussed the essential elements of a contract
briefly, it will still be necessary to analyse the term 'warranty' as it
affects marketing.
III. Warranty: the problem of definition

Until 1893, before the Sale of Goods Act, the term 'warranty' was
employed mainly in its ordinary sense of promise or guarantee. It
could be made expressly or could be implied from the circumstances
of the case. An agent 'warranted' his authority; the shipowner
'warranted' the seaworthiness of his ship and so on. The terms applied
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in a contract of sale by the common law were described as warranties.
The courts adopted this terminology and its meaning in the ordinary
sense and so did textbook writers of the period.
If the warranty were to be broken and the party injured was making
a claim to set aside the contract, he would have to prove that the fulfilment of the obligations contained in a particular warranty of the contract
constituted a 'condition precedent' to the discharging of his own
obligation under the contract. Parties to such a contract could provide
that breach of a particular provision by one party would entitle the
other to repudiate the contract. In a good number of cases, the issue
. was one of construction in which the intentions of the parties were
ascertained by reference to the circumstances of the case.
In Bethni v. Gye 7 the plaintiff had agreed with the defendant to sing
in concerts and operas in the United Kingdom for a period of threeand-a-half months from 30 March 1875, and 'to be in London
without fail at least six days before the commencement of this agreement, for the purpose of rehearsals'. Because of ill health, the plaintiff
only reached London on 28 March. The defendant decided not to
employ him in accordance with the agreement. Whether the plaintiff
could recover damages depended upon whether his arriving in London
six days before March 30 was 'a condition precedent to the defendants' liability, or only an independent agreement, a breach of which
will not justify a repudiation of the contract, but will only be a cause
of action for compensation in damages'. It was held that, taking into
account the length of the engagement, the delay in arrival at the initial
rehearsals could not amount to a breach of a condition precedent to
the defendant's liability to employ the plaintiff.
In the above case, the Judges dropped the objective 'precedent'.
Rather they used condition and warranty to describe contrasting
situations. The word 'condition' was in frequent use to denote the
terms governing a transaction (an auctioneer's 'conditions of sale'; a
carrier's condition of carriage' etc.). There was also the indirect effect
of the curious rule that 'where the property in the specific chattel has
passed to the vendee .. . he has no right, upon the breach of the
warranty, to return the article . . . unless there has been a condition in
the contract authorising the return'.s
In other words, in a contract for the sale of specific goods there had
to be a condition entitling the buyer to rescind if the warranty was
broken because breach of the warranty could not constitute a breach
of a condition precedent once property had passed. Hence, in Bannerman v. White 9 the seller of hops had, in the court's view, expressl y
warranted that no sulphur had been used in growing them ; but in addi-
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tion ~~ had by implication from the circum stances accepted it as a
condItIOn of the agreement that the buyer could rescind the contract if
he discovered, even after property had passed, that sulphur had been
used.
Lax use of terminology can result in a good deal of confusion. A
case in point is the judgement of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in
B~hn v. Burness. lO The question in issue was whether the fact that a
shIp was not at the time of the contract ' in the Port of Amsterdam ' as
stated in the charterparty gave the chatterer a right to repudiate. The
court ?egan in familiar terms by asking whether the whereabouts of
the shIp was 'a condition precedent, or only an independent agreement,. a breach of which will not justify a repudiation of the contract,
but WIll only be a cause of action for a compensation in damages'. The
court however went on to equate a warranty in relation to the subjectmatter of the contract as 'a condition on the failure or nonperfor.mance of which the other party may, if he is so minded,
repudlat~ the contract in-toto.' It then pointed out that ' if the promisee
had receIved the whole or any substantial part of the consideration ...
the warranty loses the character of a coridition, or to speak perhaps
more pro~erly, ceases to be available as a condition, and becomes a
warranty In the narrower sense of the word, viz a stipUlation by way
?f agreement, for the breach of which a compensation must be sought
In damages'.
It .must be remarked however, that many writers are agreed that at
the ttme Chalmer drafted the 1893 Act, he adopted the loose language
of the type employed in the judgement in Behn v. Burgess. A warranty
was no longer to be regarded as a contractual promise but was
ll
?efined as 'an agreement with reference to goods which are the subJect of a contract of sale but collateral to the main purpose of such
contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages but not
to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated'. Ex
hypothese a condition is a term which does give rise to a right to treat
the contract as repudiated. 12 In addition, the warranties implied in
contracts of sale that the goods should be suitable for a particular purpose and should be of merchantable quality were enacted as conditions,13 as were the undertaking as to title and the requirement that
the goods should answer the contract description.14
Under the pre-1893 law, the remedy depended as much upon the
nature of the breach as upon the status of the term broken. If a seller
was in breach of an express or an implied term of the contract the
buyer's right of repudiation depended upon his being able to show'that
the seller's fulfilling the warranty in question constituted a condition
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precedent to his own liability under the contract and that the breach in
question had gone to the root of the contract. Accordingly, if one of
these undertakings is broken the buyer is entitled to treat the contract
as at an end.

Stipulations as to time
Whether time is of the essence of a contract of sale or not depends,
according to section 100) of the Act, upon 'the terms of the contract'.
But what if there is no express term in the contract? Presumably inferences can be drawn and the apparent intention of the parties can be
i!"llplied into the contract. It is well established that in 'ordinary commercial contracts for the sale of goods ... time is primafacie of the essence with respect to delivery'. IS
The position is complicated where no precise time of shipment or
delivery is given, as in the familiar form of words that the ship
carrying the food is 'expected ready to load' by a specific date, or
during a particular period. The leading authority on the interpretation
, of this type of expression is Samuel Sunday & Co. v. Keighly, Maxted
& CO.,16 where the view of the Court of Appeal was that the statement
must be made honestly and with reasonable grounds for such an
expectation. In that case the sellers had entered into three contracts
for the sale of grain which they undertook to ship from a River Plate
port on a vessel 'expected ready to load late September'. The arbitration found that at the time the first two contracts were entered into the
sellers still reasonable expected that the vessel would be able to load in
time. By the time of the third contract, however, that expectation was
no longer reasonable. In view of the length of time that elapsed before
the vessel was ready to load, the arbitrator held that buyers were entitled to refuse to take delivery of the goods. This decision was upheld
on appeal.
What is apparent, however, is that although there is a strong
presumption that a delivery date in a commercial sale is of the essence
of a contract, this is only a prima facie rule. And where the delivery
date is imprecise, the question whether there has been a breach of a
'condition precedent' can only be decided by reference to the nature of
the circumstance arising at the time of performance. It is certainly not
true that any breach of any time clause relating to delivery ipso
facto entitles the buyer to compensation or cancellation.
The Court of Appeal made comments on the condition/warranty
dilemma in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha Ltd. 17 A ship was delivered under a time charterparty in an
unseaworthy condition, i.e. the engine room crew were not
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experienced enough to deal with the sort of difficulties that were likely
to arise from the age of the ship's engines. Engine trouble caused a fire
and delay on the first cargo-carrying voyage to Osaka, and the ship
then had to undergo extensive repairs over a period of six months
before it was mechanically sea worthy. During this period, freight
rates fell considerably. The charterers purported to repudiate the contract, alleging inter alia that the shipowners had failed to provide a
seaworthy ship.
The argument that seaworthiness of the ship constituted a condition
precedent to the charterer's obligation to continue to operate under the
charter was rejected. Under the terms of the charterparty, the
charterers were entitled to retain the use of the vessel beyond the initial
term for such periods as had been lost for a variety of causes including the circumstances that had arisen. The delay had not been so
excessive as to take the case out of the contemplation of that
provision.
In commenting on the condition/warranty dilemma, three members
of the Court of Appeal did not deny that certain terms are normally of
fundamental importance, the obvious example being the time of
delivery. But the warranty of seaworthiness was of such wide application that it was in no way possible to categorise its breach as being a
breach of condition ipso facto. It is true that many contractual undertakings can give a prima facie classification as a 'condition' and sense
for the parties to make their own classification by means of a cancellation clause. In a good number of situations it is surely as important to
have regard to the circumstances and consequences of the breach as
to the actual term broken.
IV. Agency

As a means of business practice, agency has been brought about as a
result of the many complexities of modern business life. Nowadays,
there are many advances in the fields of technology and communications. It is possible therefore for Nigerians to do business with
people in distant places like Japan, America, Europe, Asia, etc. and vice
versa.
Agency is a consensual relationship between the principal and the
agent by which the later is expressly or impliedly authorised to act on
behalf of the principal and to bring the principal into contractual
relationship with third parties. It is the power to affect the principal's
contractual relations with third parties that differentiates an agent
from a servant. Servants, too, are subject to the control of their
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masters, but a servant has no power to bind his master by contracting
with a third party.
The appointment of an agent may be oral, i.e. by word of mouth ,
written or implied from circumstances. Under Sections 67, 78, and 79
of the Property and Conveyance Law, 1959 of West and MidWestern States of Nigeria as wel1 as Section 5 of the Law Reform Act,
1961, an agent creating or dispensing of an interest in law is to be
appointed in writing. Above al1, it is considered sound commercial
prudence that an agency agreement be made in writing, setting forth
al1 its terms.
In the relationship between agent and principal there are duties and
'rights accruing therefrom. While the agent has a duty to follow and
obey the instructions given by his principal, and account properly to
his principal, he is also not permitted to place his interest in conflict
with that of his principal. On the other hand, the principal must cooperate with his agent, pay him the right remuneration, and indemnify
him against all authorised expenses.
An essential point to note is the fact that Nigerian businessmen involved in marketing nowadays continuously rise the medium of agency to carryon their activities. This makes it necessary that Nigerian
business law should be fashioned to articulate more clearly the principles of agency in al1 its ramifications to represent our own circumstances. It is an area in law the marketer will no doubt find most
useful if well understood and applied in practical business dealings.
V. Law of liability in marketing

The element of liability in the field of marketing is a very crucial one
indeed. As has been pointed out already, the notion of 'strict liability'
has evolved over a period of years until it has been recognised, in one
form or another, in the majority of jurisdictions in countries of Europe
and America and also in the East European countries. Until recent
years, an injured claimant found the road to recovery to be a rocky
one indeed. The claimant's position truly reflected the common law
maxim of caveat emptor. If the action was based on warranty, the
problem of privity of contract had to be forced. If the tort claim of
negligence was the basis for the action, proof of negligence was a
problem. These obstacles were difficult to surmount and recovery was
often denied. However, as society became less tolerant of product
failure due to faulty design, poor workmanship, and the like, and more
cognisant of the needs of the consumer, the courts began to find ways
to circumvent these hurdles. At the same time, legislative bodies
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reacted by creating statutes that removed the shields that had for so
long insulated the manufacturer.
As early as 1916, the courts began to recognise that the requirement for a contractual relationship (privity of contract) in a warranty
action belonged to the past. In case of negligence, the question of
proof became less significant as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the
thing speaks for itself) began to be applied. Often the proof of
negligence needed to satisfy the court has seemed minimal indeed.
Whether the concept of a particular court is founded on a warranty
notion or in tort, it seems reasonable to anticipate broader acceptance
of this concept and to expect that even stricter requirements will be
imposed on sellers.
In essence, the concept of strict liability makes it possible for a
seller to be held responsible for injury caused by a defective product
even though due care had been exercised in its preparation and sale.
As generally applied, privity of contract is not an iss ue; nor is proof of
negligence usually held to be a material consideration. If the broad
definition of strict liability is to be met, the basic requirement, in addition to proof that the product is defective, is that the product can be
shown to have been defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer and that the damage was predominantly caused by the defect. 18
One may well wonder why the increasing acceptance of the doctrine of strict liability in marketing. This can be attributed to the fact
that society is no longer willing to endure the hazards associated with
mass production to order to gain the concomitant benefits. It has
become a matter of public policy in many societies to recognise the
shortcomings of such producers and to hold them responsible to the
members of the public which they serve. Another argument advanced
in support of this trend is that the courts seem to have recognised that
the manufacturer is better able to bear the risk of loss than is the injured claimant. This determination is based primarily on the
reckoning that firms will be able to spread the risk of loss better than
the occasional c1aimant. 19 Justice Trayner almost 30 years ago noted:
'It should now be recognised that a manufacturer incurs an absolute
liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to human beings.'20
Application of the doctrine of strict liability leaves the seller almost
defenceless in many jurisdictions. Short of obvious misuse of the
product, assumption of the risk, or contributory negligence, little is
available for the seller unless he can prove that the harm is in no way
related to the defect, or unless he is able to raise a defence peculiar to a
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particu lar jurisdiction. Previously consumer protection has not been
received as a highly important element in marketing strategy, for
generally it has not been considered to figure strategically in the consumer's purchase decision. However, today's sophisticated consumers
will not be satisfied with half-hearted efforts and promises. Unlike
those in the past, they are likely to compare promise and performance
critically and if not pleased, take action accordingly. For example,
many of the consumers of today, rather than complain, will respond
simply by making future purchases from a competitor who does
provide consumer protection and after-purchase sat isfaction.
Although a lot of these observations are true of developed societies,
nothing says that the developing ones which are virtually copying the
marketing pattern of those countries will not be faced with similar
problems sometime in future. The law needs therefore to develop in
full cognisance of the possibility.
-~

VI. Conclusion

Our reflections on the foregoing areas in which the law is essential and
indeed indispensable to the marketer are by no means exhaustive.
However, it is clear that early business response to the current legal
and consumer environment has been very limited. The explanation for
this state of affairs may either be because firms have not acted or they
have taken only defensive measures to protect themselves from loss.
Examples of typical defensive measures are upgrading in-plant quality
controi,21 improving in-plant inspection,22 emphasising safety in
production design,23 keeping accurate records,24 increasing insurance
protection,25 and adding to legal capacity. 26
Ihs likely that in time to come the doctrine of strict liability will
evolve into what is best described as absolute liability. Certainly not
all courts will accept the concept of absolute liability without reservation. There are bound to be significant differences in application. For
example, some courts may lean towards recognition of a distinction
between large and small firms, while others may not see this as
nec.essary and will continue to refine the doctrine in other ways as yet
undetermined.
If the long-run attitude is one of dissatisfaction with the concept,
many alternative courses of action are available. Among these are insurance plans designed to limit the liability of producers, presumably
with government involvement in some way. Legislation establishing
standards and providing relief for firms that have attained those standards is another alternative. Special tax relief and distinctions related
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to firm size and the nature of the business enterprise may also be
considered.
Consumer protection has not previously been viewed as a highly
important element in marketing strategy, for it generally has not been
considered to figure strategically in the consumer's purchase decision.
However, today's sophisticated consumers will not be satisfied with
half-hearted efforts and promises. Unlike those in the past, they are
likely to compare promise and performance critically and, if not
pleased, will take action accordingly.
C. N.OKEKE
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